The effort to determine the structure of a human science of ideas, that is, a science of the intelligible pure, in which intuition and discourse come together in a coherent unity, is the main objective of the sophistic dialogue of Plato. But the problem of the constitution of this absolute science, which for Plato coincides with philosophy or dialectics, requires the elaboration of elements that, by excluding relativism from opinion, as in “Teeteto”, and by affirming ideas, as in “Parmenides”, they can establish a conception of science.
By trying to define the sophist and distinguish him from the philosopher and the politician, Plato gives us clues about what the theme of the dialogue will be. Separating what is, that is, the essence, from what appears to be, he discusses the ontological status of an object, which goes back to Parmenides, and immediately highlights the need for a reformulation. See why.
Sophists as contradictors teach, for wages, their art. The subjects on which they intend to form good contradictors are earth and celestial phenomena, as well as laws and politics. Whether in public or private meetings, they show themselves skillful in contradicting, communicating to others what they know about becoming and being. And this is how they instill in their youth that only they are the wisest, causing them to be voluntarily sought out and paid to teach their art.
However, it is impossible for a man to be omniscient, and so the sophist's claim to possess universal knowledge is nothing more than an appearance, a false reality. On the other hand, how can an incompetent in a given technique contradict a competent one? There is in the sophist's willingness to argue about all things, contradicting even an expert and putting this availability to know everything available to anyone who wants to learn and can afford it, a false appearance of science universal. It is not to be believed that whoever could not only explain and contradict, but also produce and execute all things, would soon sell them so cheaply and teach them in such a short time. Those who intend to do so do nothing but imitations and homonyms of reality, such as painting and speech. And it is to the latter that the sophist manages to give a special “shine” to illustrate his wisdom and provoke the illusory effect that maintains his reputation.
In this way, Plato, who in the dialogue exposes his thought through Elea's Stranger, approaches a tenuous, but fundamental, distinction: showing and appearing without really being; say something without, however, saying it with truth. This would be to assume the existence of falsehood and error. However, how to find in reality, to say or think that the false is real without already, when saying it, one does not fall into contradiction? This is the refuge of the sophist who uses Parmenides' relationship between “being, thinking and saying” to defend himself against the accusation of “artificer of illusion”. He denies the possibility of saying or thinking the false and leans on the Eleatic's poem:
“You will never force non-beings to be; Rather, move your thinking away from this path of investigation”.
As a result of this, Lima Vaz observes: “If every proposition is true, none is true. Logical attribution has no real stable foundation and the science of ideas dissolves into universal relativism”.
Finally, there is the problem of logically assigning two real objects so that it can express its ontological reality, that is, its truth and that requires the reformulation of the univocal vision of being parmenidic. But, as noted by Lima Vaz, this reformulation, which will take place in the episode of the “parricide”, is not a refutation of Parmenides. On the contrary, it seeks to save the essential truth of the Eleatic position which signifies the primacy of intelligence and the intelligible over the confused multiplicity of the sensible. And in this problem the problem of dialectics as a science is intrinsic, since it is necessary to know which supreme and universal ideal relations they must be involved in every dialectical judgment, so as to preserve, at the same time, the identity with itself and the mutual communion of ideas. It would be the science of being true.
Plato accepts from Parmenides the uncompromising affirmation of the pure intelligible, immutable object, above the fluctuations of opinion. But this intellectualism is a radical monism that sees ideas as purely static and without establishing any kind of relationship. Without giving up intellectualism, Plato will try to solve the problem by safeguarding unity and multiplicity in the object of intelligence.
For the Greeks, the Logos or speech is the expression of to be or of the object, thus not being able to attribute to a being the absolute non-being, that is, it is impossible to express the non-being in the discourse. So, the sophist could reply to the accusation of illusionist or image producer by questioning what is meant by “image”. The image is a copy of the real object and therefore does not identify with it. Would she then be a non-being. However, there is some being in her, a being by similarity that prevents her from being an absolute non-being. So there is a strange intertwining between being and non-being that forces the recognition that non-being somehow is and being, in some respect, is not. The possibility of error resides in this union and it allows the sophist to be assigned the domain of the simulacrum and to characterize his art as an illusionist art that distances from the real and who only forms false opinions in his disciples because he, the sophist, admits that non-being is inexpressible, unspeakable, ineffable, that is, that non-being is é. Here Plato feels the need to leave the logical-verbal plane and call Parmenides' being-one to judgment.
The definition of being-one, in which being is understood as absolute totality and where unity excludes plurality, requires further investigation. For example, is the double designation of being and one with being possible if it presents itself as absolute? How can we also give it any name without reintroducing the name/thing duality into absolute unity, transforming the absolute unity into a purely verbal unity? However, if the being-one presents itself as a whole made up of parts, the unity attributed to it is not the absolute unity. Whether being is a whole not composed of parts, or whether the whole exists and being as one is affected by the duality of being and of the whole or the whole does not exist and the being does not have a unity that belongs to the whole and would then be infinite plurality. This would be Plato's reduction to absurdity of the being-one of Parmenides, who denies plurality and shows that such denial implies the destruction of the unity of being.
To better substantiate his argument, Plato goes even further. He will criticize the philosophical tradition, bringing together the various trends in two great poles: the materialists, also considered physiologists, pluralists or motorists; and idealists, who in turn can be confused with monists or immobilists. Plato reproaches the ancients for neglecting the question of essence, of being (what is it?), limiting himself only to the qualities of the object.
To the former, he criticizes the fact that they admit the existence only of what can affect sensibility and offer resistance, that is, bodies inserted in becoming. Against them, Plato raises the following hypotheses: either being is a third element, or it identifies itself with one of the elements or with all of them. In any case, there is an internal contradiction between being as such in its unity and the group of elements with the which are identified and so there would be a prior determination of the notion of being in itself, in pure intelligibility.
To the seconds, which separate becoming from being and believe that the body is in contact with becoming while the soul contemplates the true that is incorporeal, it is an idea that remains always identical, Plato questions the meaning of this communion. How does the soul, which is active, know something that is immobile, that is, passive, without it, from this process, starting to move?
What Plato wants to show is that there is neither universal mobility nor immobility. He proposes to materialists the existence of some incorporeal ways to break the rigidity of their position. If it is accepted that what makes the soul fair, wise and beautiful is the presence and possession of Justice, Wisdom and Beauty and as these objects are not corporeal, then some incorporeal beings are admitted. For idealists, it is necessary to introduce movement as a possibility of relationship, within the intelligible being, in order to overcome the rigidity of the eleatic one that “friends of ideas" attributed to them. It is in this sense that Plato coins the term dynamis (potency), which means the ability to act or to be acted upon and which makes it possible to overcome the two extreme positions, in addition to allowing the nature of the being to reveal itself. And, in the “Sophist”, this term expresses the character of a principle, active or passive of a relationship, which, in a way, generalized, understands the very ideal relationship of being known, which does not imply any real change on the object. And the dynamis which implies activity in the faculty of knowing (subject-soul) and passivity in the known object. It is the very condition of your reality since it is through it that the real being manifests. And if this relationship is excluded from the plane of existence (thus bequeathed to the generation) and it is not admitted that the soul knows and that the existence (object) is known, the following is the case. dilemma: either it refuses to be, in its totality, the movement, and, therefore, the life, the soul and the intelligence, or it is conceded that these belong to the total being, but it refuses the movement. The first hypothesis denies the reality of intelligence and thus the possibility of knowing. The second is, of course, nonsense.
Thus, Plato refuses the identity of being to movement and rest. On the contrary, the being is external and is participated by them. The soul (and with it movement) enters the perfectly real realm with the same title as the Ideas, otherwise all knowledge becomes impossible. However, this movement does not affect the intrinsic reality of ideas, as the essential condition of knowledge is the permanence of state, mode and object.
By João Francisco P. Cabral
Brazil School Collaborator
Graduated in Philosophy from the Federal University of Uberlândia - UFU
Master's student in Philosophy at the State University of Campinas - UNICAMP
Source: Brazil School - https://brasilescola.uol.com.br/filosofia/o-episodio-parricidio-salvacao-inteligencia-no-sofista-platao.htm